Comparative Civilizations Review
Volume 83
Number 83 Fall

Article 15

9-2020

Political Power of Iranian Hierocracies
János Jany
Pázmány Péter Catholic University, Budapest, Hungary, jany.janos@btk.ppke.hu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr
Part of the Comparative Literature Commons, History Commons, International and Area Studies
Commons, Political Science Commons, and the Sociology Commons

Recommended Citation
Jany, János (2020) "Political Power of Iranian Hierocracies," Comparative Civilizations Review: Vol. 83 :
No. 83 , Article 15.
Available at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol83/iss83/15

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at BYU ScholarsArchive. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Comparative Civilizations Review by an authorized editor of BYU ScholarsArchive. For
more information, please contact scholarsarchive@byu.edu, ellen_amatangelo@byu.edu.

Jany: Political Power of Iranian Hierocracies

Comparative Civilizations Review

67

Political Power of Iranian Hierocracies
János Jany
jany.janos@btk.ppke.hu
Department of International Studies, Pázmány Péter Catholic University,
Budapest, Hungary
Abstract
The aim of the paper is to demonstrate that the current Iranian regime is no novelty in
Iranian history and political thinking, but has two antecedents: the rule of the Sasanians
in late Antiquity (3rd–7th centuries) and that of the Safavids (16th–18th centuries) in
modern times. After a brief outline of relevant historical events the paper scrutinizes
the common features of these three regimes. The comparison includes the analyses of
foreign policy, its scope, aim and direction, cultural policy and the relevance of political
ideologies, socio-economic policy, religious policy, political structure and mechanisms
of decision-making. The results of the comparison are visualized in a table pointing out
numerous similarities and remarkable common features throughout the centuries.
Keywords: Iran, hierocracy, comparative politics, religion
Introduction
The nature and causes of the Islamic revolution have been the focus of attention of
social scientists for decades, but the answers they have provided for this undoubtedly
complex phenomenon emphasize considerably different aspects. There is an enormous
amount of literature dealing with the subject.
Some deal with the Iranian revolution within the theoretical framework of Islamism and
underline that the Iranian revolution is a manifestation of modern political Islam.1
These writers are interested in what can be fitted into the theoretical framework of
political Islam and pay less attention to the historical and cultural background of Iranian
society.

1

Peter Mandaville: Global Political Islam. Routledge: London: 2007: 179-197; Olivier Roy: The
Failure of Political Islam. I. B. Tauris: London: 1994: 168-183; Olivier Roy: Globalized Islam: The
Search for a New Umma. Columbia University Press: New York: 2004: 83-88; Mohammed Ayoob:
The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim World. The University of
Michigan Press: Ann Arbor: 2008: 42-63; Tarek Osman: Islamism. A History of Political Islam from
the Fall of the Ottoman Empire to the Rise of ISIS. Yale University Press: New Haven and London:
2016:189-216.
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Other writings are works of modern historians pointing out Iranian socio-economic
peculiarities in detail, while putting less emphasis on ideological features.2
This essay does not belong to either of these types, since it intends to approach the
problem rather from the global viewpoint of history.
As we will see, the current system is not the only hierocratic form of rule in Iran, but it
has two antecedents during the long history of the Iranian nation. That is why it seems
worthwhile to compare and contrast these systems, and to underline similarities and
differences between them, which in turn will also provide us with the opportunity to
draw more general conclusions.
1. Turning points in Iranian history
A history going back thousands of years could not be told in one article; therefore, I
will highlight only some decisive turning points in Iranian history that will help to
understand the main arguments of this paper.
1.1 Ancient Iran
Pastoralist tribes speaking various dialects of Iranian languages arrived on the Iranian
plateau around 1000 BCE and settled down in Western Iran along the Zagros
Mountains. Tribes which later came to be known as Medes settled close to the eastern
border of the then powerful Assyrians, a military hegemon of the Ancient Near East
which regarded the presence of the Median tribal confederacy both as a military threat
and an opportunity to gain horses which the Assyrian army greatly needed. As a result,
wars were fought with Assyrian victories, but when the Median leaders formed an
alliance with the Babylonians, they were powerful enough to drastically change events.
In a couple of years, the most important Assyrian cities, including the capital, fell into
the hands of the allied forces and the last battle in 610 BCE diminished the Assyrian
state altogether. The territory of the former Assyrian state was divided between the
Medes and the Babylonians, two powerful empires which regarded each other more and
more as rivals, not allies. Open hostilities were abandoned, however, and the next
decades witnessed an equilibrium of forces in the Near East.3

2

Charles Kurzman: The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Mass.:
2005; Nikkie R. Keddie: Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution: Yale University Press: New
Haven: 2003: 214-240; Ervand Abrahamian: Khomeinism. Essays on the Islamic Republic. University
of California Press: Berkeley: 1993; Said Amir Arjomand. After Khomeini: Iran under His Successors.
Oxford University Press: Oxford: 2009. David Menashri: Post-Revolutionary Politics in Iran.
Routledge: New York: 2001.
3

For more on these wars see: Amelie Kuhrt: The Persian Empire. Routledge: London: 2009: 19-46.
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This situation came to an end when Kurush (Cyrus), backed by the Persian tribes,
revolted against Astyages, the last king of the Medes, and secured his victory on the
battlefield near Pasargade with the help of the Median aristocracy changing sides.
With the great wars of Cyrus and his son Cambyses (530–522 BCE), the Persian Empire
grew to an unprecedented extent, including territories from Egypt to Afghanistan, and
Pakistan to Bulgaria and Greece. Although Darius I and his son, Xerxes, ultimately lost
the Greek wars, it was by no means a great disaster for the Persians. The real problems
were found within the empire itself: ineffective government, heavy taxation, open
revolts and harem intrigues prevented the Achaemenid Empire from stabilizing itself in
a radically changing environment (the rise of the Macedonians; the secession of Egypt;
and the wars of the governors with each other).
When Alexander sought revenge for Athens, he found a disorganized state which fell
to him within a few years. But Alexander seems to have had no strategy for the future,
or at least was prevented from acting accordingly by his early death, a consequence of
his dissolute lifestyle.
As a result, open hostility broke out between his former commanders to decide
succession, with Seleukos emerging as victor (Ipsos: 301 BCE). This is how the
Seleucids came to power in Iran and the Near East.4
But Seleucid power did not last for long in Iran because they lost more and more
territories to an Eastern Iranian tribal federation, the Parnis. The Parnis settled down in
the north-eastern province of Iran already known during Achaemenian times as
Parthava. They were renamed after it, which is the reason they are called Parthians
today. The Parthians annexed Iran and later also Mesopotamia from the Seleucids and
under strong leadership by kings, such as Mithridates I (171–138 ) and Mithridates II
(123–87), they established an Iranian empire large enough to be a dangerous rival to the
Romans during the coming centuries.
The Parthians restored the Achaemenid Empire without the territories of Egypt, Asia
Minor and Palestine, although they did everything to have access to the Mediterranean
Sea through Syria and Palestine. The Romans, for their part, wanted to prevent the
Parthians from occupying these strategically important territories, both for military
A classic about this period is Albert T. Olmstead’s: History of the Persian Empire. Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press: 1948; fine comprehensive surveys are Richard N. Frye’s: The Heritage of
Persia. The World Publishing Company: Cleveland and New York: 1963: 53-114 and Josef
Wiesehöfer’s: Ancient Persia from 550 BC to 650 AD. I. B. Tauris: London 1996: 5-102; the work of
Muhammad Dandamaev and Vladimir Lukonin: The Culture and Social Institutions of Ancient Iran.
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge: 1989 discusses political, economic and social institutions and
various aspects of cultural life; recently Amelie Kuhrt’s: The Persian Empire. Routledge: London:
2009 covers the topic and the period in the same depth.
4
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reasons and for long distance trade, resulting in unavoidable hostilities. The great
Roman-Parthian wars of the first two centuries CE always started with Roman military
successes but ended with peace treaties confirming the status quo.
When during the first years of the 3rd century CE Caracalla was defeated by the
Parthians, nobody believed this powerful kingdom would soon be destroyed.5
Here history repeated itself: as in the case of the Medians, a regional power not
overthrown by rival states, its sudden end came from within in the form of a revolt,
seemingly unimportant at the beginning but growing very dangerous with the powerful
nobility changing sides.
In the case of the Parthians, Ardashir, a local Persian leader in the remote province of
Pars, revolted against the Parthian king who was engaged in world politics and paid no
attention to his case. But Ardashir’s revolt spread as he won more and more battles
against other local leaders and in the end established himself as the greatest challenge
to the Parthian king. The final battle was won by Ardashir with most of the Parthian
nobility on his side. This is how the Parthian kingdom came to a sudden end and the
Persian Sasanian dynasty started.6
With the coming to power of the Sasanians, the political landscape of Iran changed: the
religion of Zarathustra (Zoroaster) evolved more and more into central position both in
a religious and political sense; a new Zoroastrian church was established, an ecclesiastic
organisation unknown to the Achaemenids and the Parthians.
The Sasanian kings tried to centralise their monarchy, though this effort was hindered
by the joint opposition of the nobility (both Parthian and Persian) and the Zoroastrian
clergy. Foreign policy, however, remained unchanged, and the strategic importance of
the Levant was also acknowledged by the Sasanians, who fought bloody and victorious
wars with the Romans during the 3rd century. The celebrated victories of Shapur I over
the Romans (244; 259–260) correspond at the same time to the shame of the Roman
rulers being captured or killed in the battlefield.
In spite of this, the Sasanians were prevented from occupying Syria and the Levant and
with the death of Shapur I, former Persian victories were transformed into heroic stories
of the glorious past, yet were unable to prevent the Romans to retaliating for their losses.
After decades of warfare the border was established, as in the case of the Parthians, at
Richard N. Frye’s: The Heritage of Persia. The World Publishing Company: Cleveland and New
York: 1963: 124-168 has a balanced view on the role of the Seleucid’s in Iran and the Hellenistic
heritage; for the rule of the Arsacids (Parthians) see Frye: 170-197, Wiesehöfer: Ancient Persia from
550 BC to 650 AD. I. B. Tauris: London: 1996: 115-149 and Klaus Schippmann: Grundzüge der
Parthischen Geschichte. Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft: Darmstadt: 1980.
6
The story of Ardasir’s coming to power is narrated by a short work full of legends and contradictions
called Kar Namag-i Ardasir (accessible in Middle Persian in H. S. Nyberg’s: Manual of Pahlavi vol. III: Otto Harrassowitz: Wiesbaden: 1974.).
5
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status quo ante. During the long reign of Shapur II (309–379), the Sasanian state
witnessed remarkable stability and prosperity.
But the next decades proved to be very turbulent both in domestic and foreign policy.
The coming of the Huns from the East and the catastrophic foreign policy of Peroz
forced the empire to subjugation by the Huns. Peroz’s son, Kavad, was also unable to
restore law and order and to free Iran from the Huns, while the Mazdakite uprising
against the nobility and feudal system contributed to more chaos.
It was left to Khusrav I (531–579) to secure law and order, gain victory over the Huns,
and re-establish a state on solid ground both politically and economically. Small
wonder that Khusrav was and still is regarded as one of the most talented and celebrated
Persian kings. His son, Ormazd, followed the path of his father but was dethroned and
killed by conspirators from among the nobility who secured the throne for his son,
Khusrav II (590–628). This king opened hostilities with the Byzantines which resulted
in a nearly 25-year war ending in 628 with catastrophic consequences: with no territory
won the empire suffered heavily. It lost a great amount of military forces and labourers,
was ruined economically, and its king was killed in the end by the hands of his own
men.
The next decades bear witness to the agony of the dynasty unable to restore order even
in its own palace, due to constant harem intrigues, a situation very similar to that of the
last decades of the Achaemenids. To press similarities further: with Yazdagerd III, the
last Sasanian king, we have a tragic historical figure similar to Darius III: both kings
had to face a powerful enemy with a disintegrated, ruined empire. Just as Darius III
lost to Alexander, so did Yazdagerd III to the Arab-Muslim army.7
1.2 The coming of Islam to Iran
The demise of the Sasanians was perhaps the most important turning point in Iranian
history: not only a dynasty disappeared, but Iran as a hegemonic power in the Middle
East and a sovereign state ceased to exist.

For the Sasanian political history books of reference are Richard N. Frye’s: The Heritage of Persia.
The World Publishing Company: Cleveland and New York: 1963: 198-222 and Klaus Schippmann’s:
Grundzüge der Geschichte des sasanidischen Reiches. Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft: Darmstadt:
1990. Josef Wiesehöfer’s: Ancient Persia from 550 BC to 650 AD. I. B. Tauris: London: 1996: 151-221
and Touraj Daryaee’s: Sasanian Empire:The Rise and Fall of an Empire. I. B. Tauris: New York: 2009
discuss in addition to political history also social and economic institutions, religions, the arts and
sciences. A classic on Sasanian economic history remains Franz Altheim – Ruth Stiehl’s: Ein
Asiatischer Staat. Limes Verlag: Wiesbaden: 1954; on social history: Ahmad Tafazzoli: Sasanian
Society. Bibliotheca Persica Press: New York: 2000. A new theory was developed about the fall of the
Sasanians by Parvaneh Pourshariati: Decline and Fall of the Sasanian Empire. The Sasanian-Parthian
Confederacy and the Arab Conquest of Iran. I. B. Tauris: New York: 2017.
7
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What is more, the native Iranian religion, Zoroastrianism, lost ground against Islam
which became dominant within three centuries as more and more individuals and
communities embraced Islam.8
As a result, Iran lost its former status and became one region of many in the Umayyad
Caliphate. After 750, with the Abbasids on the rise, the importance of Iranian cultural
heritage grew, symbolised by the new capital, Baghdad, where Iranian influence was
heavily felt, most notably in the state administration.9
When the power of the caliphate was in a steady decline during the next centuries, we
can witness the secession of the periphery, among them Iranian territories, from the
Caliphate. This is the reason why local dynasties such as the Samanids (East Iran), the
Saffarids (South Iran), the Buyids or Buvayhids (West Iran) managed to establish semiindependent states which remained within the boundaries of the Caliphate and
acknowledged the caliph as their supreme lord.
Things changed drastically when the Saljuqids, a confederacy of nomadic tribes of
Turkish origin who entered Iran in the first half of the 11th century, captured Baghdad
and devastated the Byzantine emperor’s army in the battle of Manzikert (1071), a
victory of importance for the next centuries.10 The Saljuqids established their own reign
in Iran, converted to Islam but failed to unite the country effectively, although a member
of the local gentry, Nizam al-mulk (1017–1092), a genius in public administration, did
everything to form an effective government. The last ruler, Sanjar’s death (1157) in
East Iran marked the end of the dynasty and the beginning of a new power vacuum.11
This power vacuum was brutally filled by the invading Mongols who entered East Iran
at the beginning of the thirteenth century, and their conquest was only stopped by the
Mamluks in 1260 in Syria. Since the ruling dynasties’ power was split according to the
territories in their control (e.g. the Golden Horde, the Mongol dynasty in China), the
Mongols remaining in Iran formed the Ilkhanid dynasty.

8

For the spread of Islam in Iran and the various political and religious resistance against it see Patricia
Crone: The Nativist Prophets and Early Islamic Iran. Rural Revolt and Local Zoroastrianism.
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge: 2012.
9
For the Abbasids and their administration see Ira M. Lapidus: A History of Islamic Societies.
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge: 2014: 74-85; a classic study of the first Islamic centuries
remains that of Michael Morony: Iraq after the Muslim Conquest. Princeton University Press:
Princeton: 1984.
10
For the political history of these turbulent centuries see Bertold Spuler: Iran in früh-Islamischer Zeit.
Politik, Kultur, Verwaltung, und Öffentliches Leben Zwischen der Arabischen und der Seldschukischen
Eroberung 633 bis 1055. Franz Steiner Verlag: Wiesbaden: 1952:69-111.
11
A detailed overview about the political development during the reign of the Seljuqids is provided by
C. E. Bosworth: The Political and Dynastic History of the Iranian World AD 1000-1217. In: The
Cambridge History of Iran. Vol. 5: Cambridge University Press: Cambridge: 1968:1-202.
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Established by a grandson of Genghis Khan, Hülegü (1218–1265), this dynasty
remained in power for less than a century, with Iran falling into a power vacuum again
upon Arpa Khan’s death (1336).
The Mongol invasion brought devastation and horror at the beginning but there was
also some cultural flourishing at its end. It was Ghazan Khan (1295–1304) who did the
most to create a unified and prosperous state from a devastated country by instituting
martial rule, stopping plunder and other forms of devastation, and establishing a state
administration with the help of Iranian collaborators. His reforms did not last long,
however, and Iran became disunited again after a few decades of his descendants’
unfortunate rule.12
The next unified Iranian government was established only in 1501 with the Safavids
coming to power. In the interlude Iran or, properly speaking, some parts of Iran, were
governed for shorter or longer periods by Timur and his successors, the Timurids
(1370–1506) in the east and the south,13 the Qara Qoyunlus (1380–1468) and the Aq
Qoyunlus (1378–1508), Turkish nomadic tribal confederations, in the west and the
north.14
The rising of the Safavids was, therefore, an important turning point, marking the end
of the period of fragmentation and the birth of a central government. The changes
brought about by the Safavids were more complex than this. The Safavids were
originally masters of a Sufi order founded by Safi al-Din, a highly respected figure
among his contemporaries who lived in Ardabil during the last decades of Mongol rule
in Iran. The Safavid order evolved over the next century into an influential and
powerful Sufi brotherhood with no direct political aspirations.
When, however, Shaykh Junayd changed policy in the middle of the 15th century, the
Safavids entered Anatolian politics, made an alliance with the Aq Qoyunlus and even
participated in local wars where Junayd and later his son and successor, Haydar, lost
their lives. The Safavids were backed by many Anatolian Turkmen tribal warriors, the
Qizilbash who formed the main basis of their army.
With their help the very young Isma’il, the leader of the order, became victorious in
these local tribal rivalries and was crowned Iranian king in 1501.
12

Svat Soucek: A History of Inner Asia. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge: 2000: 103-122; John
Andrew Boyle: Dynastic and Political History of the Il-Khans. In: The Cambridge History of Iran. Vol.
5: Cambridge University Press: Cambridge: 1968: 303-421; for the information of the eyewitness
historiographer of the Mongol period see Rashid al-Din: The Successors of Genghis Khan (Translated
from the Persian by John Andrew Boyle). Columbia University Press: New York: 1971.
13
Beatrice Manz: Power, Politics and Religion in Timurid Iran. Cambridge University Press:
Cambridge: 2007: 13-49.
14
H. R. Roemer: The Türkmen Dynasties. In: The Cambridge History of Iran. Vol. 6: Cambridge
University Press: Cambridge: 1986: 147-188.
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Shah Isma’il, as he was known from this time on, declared Shi’ism as the state religion,
causing indignation among the Sunni majority of Iran.
After the successful conquest of modern-day Iran and some parts of Iraq and
Afghanistan, the encounter with the Ottomans – who regarded the Safavids with good
reason a powerful rival – was inevitable. The battle of Chaldiran (1514) showed the
military supremacy of the Ottomans and ruined the myth of Isma’il’s invincibility;
therefore, the treaty of Amasya in 1555 was concluded in favour of the Ottomans.
Safavids were, by contrast, more successful in the eastern frontier where Shah Tahmasb
(1524–1576) defeated the invading Uzbeks and annexed some territories in the east
around Qandahar.15
Securing thus both the western and the eastern frontiers, a new Iranian state emerged
governed by a former Sufi brotherhood of Turkish origin. But the new regime was
more and more Iranicized as local experts were needed to run an effective government.
When the capital was later moved from Tabriz to Isfahan, this change was expressed
symbolically, too.
The Qizilbash Turkmen warriors, however, did not welcome these changes and tried to
regain their former leading positions, even threatening the royal power of the kings.
With the liquidation of the Qizilbash leaders, Shah cAbbas I put an end to this power
struggle and secured absolute power for the kings.
With Shah cAbbas the Great, we have the most capable Safavid king on the Iranian
throne, one who effectively strengthened royal power against nomadic influence. He
terminated their political and economic privileges, established a more effective central
government than his predecessors, reformed the army which enabled him to wage wars
with decisive victories, and developed infrastructure by building roads and bridges, thus
contributing to the flourishing of local and long-distance trade. He also had a tolerant
policy toward non-Muslims but was at the same time intolerant against Muslim heretics.
The beautiful city centre of Isfahan as we know it today was also taking shape during
his reign.
Unfortunately for the Safavids no such competent king ever emerged from among Shah
Abbas the Great’s offspring, and the rule of the Safavids started to decline.
Deteriorating economically, militarily and politically, Sultan Husain (1688–1726) was
unable to stop invading Afghan tribesmen who managed to blockade the capital causing
endless suffering for the inhabitants (1722).

15

H. R. Roemer: The Safavid Period. In: The Cambridge History of Iran. Vol. 6: Cambridge University
Press: Cambridge: 1986: 189-350; for recent studies see Andrew J. Newman: Safavid Iran: Rebirth of a
Persian Empire. I. B. Tauris: New York: 2006; and Roger Savory: Iran under the Safavids. Cambridge
University Press: Cambridge: 2007 (originally published in 1980): 27-75.
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Though the Afghan interlude did not last for long, with the collapse of the Safavids,
Iran remained disunited for the rest of the 18th century because neither Nadir Shah
(1736–1747) in the east nor the much beloved Karim Khan Zand (1751–1779) in the
south-west were able to unite the country.16
1.3. The Modern Period
Only with Agha Mohammed Khan (1789–1797) and the rise of the Qajars (1789–1925)
was there a united Iran again.
The Qajars were no newcomers in Iranian politics: a tribe of Turkoman origin in northeastern Iran, they had close relations with the Safavids, enjoying prominence during
their rule. After the demise of the Safavids, the Qajars contested for power for half a
century with the Zands, which they won in the end. The backwardness of Iran became
manifest during the Qajar rule which was to be seen not only with respect to the
European countries but also to the Ottomans and the Russians.
This is the reason why the Qajars lost all military encounters with the Russians during
the reign of Fath cAli Shah (1797–1834) and lost considerable territories in the
following humiliating peace treaties. Although some efforts of reform were made
during the long reign of Nasir al-Din Shah (1848–1896), notably by the reforming
minister, Amir Kabir (1848–1852), his assassination marked also the end of any such
policies.
Ineffective governance, harsh rule, corruption, and humiliating concessions granted to
foreigners gave rise to an opposition wanting gradual reforms. These demands included
a constitution which was granted at the end by Mozaffar al-Din Shah in 1906, after
some protests and demonstrations. The first Iranian constitution was modelled on the
constitution of Belgium (1831), though political and social circumstances were rather
different in Iran. As a result, the constitution did not bring calm into Iranian domestic
politics, which became more complicated when the First World War broke out.
Though declared neutral, considerable parts of Persia were occupied by the rival powers
(Ottomans, Russians, Britain). No wonder, then, that at the end of the war Qajar rule
was de facto non-existent, which made it possible for Reza Khan, Commander of only
2,500 Cossacks, to enter the capital in 1921. He became Minister of War that year,

16

Roger Savory: Iran under the Safavids. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge: 2007: 76-103, 226253; John Perry: The Zand dynasty. In: The Cambridge History of Iran. Vol. 7: Cambridge University
Press: Cambridge: 1991: 63-103.
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2020

9

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 83 [2020], No. 83, Art. 15

76

Number 83, Fall 2020

Prime Minister in 1923, and was crowned as king in 1926. He took the name Pahlavi
(a hint to the Sasanian period) and this is how the Pahlavi dynasty was born.17
Modelled on Kemal Atatürk’s reforms, a modernization period began which was
accompanied by westernization and secularization (expansion of the army,
improvement of transport infrastructure, education reforms, new dress code, language
reform, renaming the country from Persia to Iran) which met social opposition headed
by the ‘ulama’, who feared to lose their traditional power (education, vaqfs, courts). As
a result of Reza Shah’s pro-German policy during the 1930s British and Soviet forces
entered Iran in 1941, and the shah abdicated in favour of his son.
Mohammed Reza took effective control only after 1946 when the Azerbaijan crisis was
solved, and the Soviet troops withdrew from Iran. A new crisis soon emerged when
Mohammed Mosaddeq, leader of the National Front, became Prime Minister in 1951,
and decided to nationalize Iranian oil. This made him very popular in the country, but
he was unable to settle all domestic and international problems resulting from this action
(the blockade of the British, large debt).
Mosaddeq was finally removed from office in 1953 with the help of the CIA (Operation:
Ajax) and sentenced to life-long house arrest. Though this action brought the king back
to full control again, it gave rise to enduring nationwide conspiracy theories about
hidden foreign manipulations in Iranian politics. Moreover, the coup made the shah a
close ally of the USA, his position being denounced by the opposition as a puppet of
the Americans (see such caricatures after the revolution).
The king continued the reforms initiated by his father some decades earlier including
more educational reforms, land reform, liberalization, and modernization of the army.
It was put together in a program called the White Revolution in the 1960s. Being a
nationalistic, secular westernization, this program again met the opposition of the
‘ulama’, this time headed by a young cleric, Khomeini, who was expelled from the
country.
The 1970s saw an economic boom fuelled by rising income from the oil industry and
at the same time the controversies over the land reform, which made millions of people
unemployed. It forced them to settle in cities looking for jobs, more often than not in
vain.
17

A detailed analysis of the events is provided by Gavin Hambly: Agha Muhammad Khan and the
Establishment of the Qajar Dynasty. In: The Cambridge History of Iran, vol. 7. Cambridge University
Press: Cambridge: 1991: 104-143; Nikkie R. Keddie: Iran under the Later Qajars. In: The Cambridge
History of Iran, vol. 7. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge: 1991: 174-212; Nikkie R. Keddie:
Qajar Iran and the Rise of Reza Khan 1796-1925. Mazda Publishers: Costa Mesa, California: 1999:1477; Nikkie R. Keddie: Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution. Yale University Press: New
Haven: 2006: 22-73; Richard Yann: A Social and Political History since the Qajars. Cambridge
University Press: Cambridge: 2019: 1-159.
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Thus, as a result of the reforms, Iranian society became polarised between the very few
rich and a mass of people living in poverty; therefore, dissatisfaction with the regime
grew. Dissenters were silenced with the help of the security agency SAVAK for
decades, but repression failed at the end and revolutionary forces were not to be stopped
even by imposing martial law in 1978.
Since the army was not in full control of the situation the shah fled the country the next
year and made the way free for Khomeini to return.18
2. Iranian hierocracies in history
2.1 Zoroastrianism
The Avesta, the holy book of the original Iranian religion, Zoroastrianism, has several
terms to refer to ecclesiastic functions. One of them, ratu, designates a peculiar group
of priests, who were more than priests performing rituals but had to be regarded rather
as spiritual leaders, and whose unquestionable intellectual abilities and social authority
gave them absolute power with respect to the people under their care. Besides religious
leadership this included legal competence as well, since the ratu had the power to
excommunicate those who challenged their leadership.
Therefore, as demonstrated by Philip G. Kreyenbroek, the leadership of a spiritual
authority is deeply rooted in Iranian tradition and goes back millennia (Kreyenbroek
1994, 3-5).19 There seemed to be no fundamental change in the ratu’s competencies
for centuries since in the Sasanian era (224–651 CE): the rad continued to be a spiritual
leader of those under his leadership, and in line with Sasanian politics, he was also the
discretionary judge of sins and crimes committed against religious morality (Jany 2007,
350-352).20 Against this background it is worth considering the political leadership of
spiritual authorities in Iranian history.

18

The modernisation policy of the Pahlavis and its failures and contradictions are analysed by Gavin
Hambly: The Pahlavi Autocracy. In: The Cambridge History of Iran, vol. 7. Cambridge University
Press: Cambridge: 1991:213-296; Nikkie R. Keddie: Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution.
Yale University Press: New Haven: 2006: 132-169; Ervand Abrahamian: A History of Modern Iran.
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge: 2008: 65-158; see also Vanessa Martin’s book on the
constitutional revolution: Islam and Modernism. The Iranian Revolution of 1906. I. B. Tauris: London:
1989 and her most recent Iran between Islamic Nationalism and Secularism: The Constitutional
Revolution of 1906. I. B. Tauris: London (British Institute of Persian Studies): 2013.
19
Philip G. Kreyenbroek: On the concept of spiritual authority in Zoroastrianism. In: Jerusalem Studies
in Arabic and Islam 17 (1994): 3–5. The Hebrew University of Jerusalem: Jerusalem.
20
Jany Janos: Criminal Justice in Sasanian Persia. In: Iranica Antiqua XLII (2007): 350–352. Peeters
Publisher: Ghent.
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At first sight the Achaemenid period (559–331 BCE) has no place in a discussion on
hierocracy since the rule of the Achaemenids was a secular monarchy with no official
state religion and, therefore, providing considerable religious autonomy to its subject
peoples. Even so we can witness references to the high god Ahura Mazda in the
inscriptions of Persian rulers, but it was a common practice for centuries and fits the
political traditions of the Ancient Near East.
More significant than this is the so-called daiva-inscription of Xerxes (486–465 BCE),
a royal edict which orders the destruction of the temples of false gods and forbids the
cult of demons ( = false gods) as the only sign of religious intolerance in this period.21
While it is unclear against which religion’s practice the order was issued,22 it is evident
that it represents a policy change compared to earlier practice.
The replacement of the secular, agriculture-based Ancient Persian calendar by a fully
Zoroastrian calendar in the second half of the Achaemenid era was another step to
establish a more religion-based political structure,23 but the inscription of Darius I (522–
486 BCE) and its worldview is of primary importance for our present investigation.
In fact, Darius I came to power through a conspiracy followed by an armed revolt which
took Darius almost two years to suppress.24 After his victory, Darius put in writing his
own version of the events in the rock inscription near Behistun, in which the king
presented himself as a representative of law and order and the favourite of the divinity.
This is commonplace in the Near East, but he goes further and condemns his enemies
as men of lies. It is hard to overestimate the significance of this rhetoric because in
Zoroastrianism lying (Old Persian drauga, Avestan druj) is one of the most evil acts
which is attached to the world of Angra Mainyu (Evil Spirit) and his associates like Azi
Dahaka, a fearful dragon who was defeated by the great Iranian hero Thraetaona.

21

The Old Persian text is edited by Roland G. Kent in his: Old Persian: Grammar, Texts, Lexicon.
American Oriental Society: New Haven: 1953: 151.
22
The interpretation of the inscription is still subject to debate among Iranists as the word daiva
(demon) could refer to various entities unacceptable for the Persian king. It could denote foreign gods
and their cults (Babilonian or even, Greek gods), or the ancient Iranian pantheon the gods of which
were declared demons by Zoroaster in his teaching to highlight the role of the supreme god
Ahuramazda.
23
Muhammad Dandamaev – Vladimir Lukonin: The Culture and Social Institutions of Ancient Iran.
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge: 1989: 290-292.
24
Darius told the story completely different, of course, and his version was accepted also among
Iranists. It was Olmstead who expressed his doubts first and pointed at the contradictions in the
narrative: Albert T. Olmstead: History of the Persian Empire. Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press: 1948: 109.
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In this way the king transferred religious dualism into a concrete political situation
elevating the fight for political power to a cosmic level in which Darius represents law
and order and righteousness while his enemies the forces of destruction symbolised by
the act of lie. In referring to this dualism between the forces of order and destruction
Darius implicitly puts himself into the position of Thraetaona and his enemies to the
role of Azi Dahaka, the embodiment of lie. Since according to the dualistic Iranian
(Zoroastrian) worldview mankind is divided between the righteous (ashavan) and the
liars and the wicked, his inscription fits perfectly into the religious understanding of his
own society.25
Though modern Shi’ism was developed independently from Zoroastrian dogma, the
heritage of age-old Iranian worldview and way of thinking could nevertheless remain
alive in some religious and political affairs. It is probably no accident that Khomeini,
the leader of the Iranian revolution also fought against several “Satans” (such as the
shah and his ally, the United States, together with the Iraqi leader, Saddam Husain),
thus making his political adversaries evil creatures.
And while political opponents all over the world fight each other with rhetorical
weapons, the elevation of their struggle to a cosmic level is not a general tendency. It
was the deeply religious American president, G. W. Bush, who understood the real
message of this rhetoric and answered in his own way with the creation of the Axis of
Evil.26 From this point on, it was not two rival states (Iran and the USA) any more who
oppose each other but two ‘Satans’ struggle against each other and in such a situation
there is no room for compromise.
Small wonder then that after Khomeini’s death, this “satanic” rhetoric was dropped
from the Iranian political discourse to achieve a less confrontational policy towards the
US, and the new American president also put an end to the previous rhetoric.
A more developed example of hierocracy was born in the Sasanian period. Immediately
after his military coup d’état, the new Sasanian king Ardashir (224–240 CE) embarked
on centralisation on a scale never seen before: he eliminated the previously existing
small kingdoms within the empire and established a central administration, which his
successors brought to further perfection throughout the centuries. As a result, districts,
towns and villages came into being as the basic units of administration.
25

R. C. Zaehner: The Teachings of the Magi. A Compendium of Zoroastrian Beliefs. Oxford University
Press: New York: 1976: 29-34; Mary Boyce: Zoroastrians. Their Religious Beliefs and Practices.
Routledge and Kegan Paul: London, Boston: 1979: 8; Michael Stausberg in his recent monograph
analyses in length the religious motivations of the Old Persian inscriptions, notably that of Darius I, and
higlights the parallel between Darius and Thraetaona: Michael Stausberg: Die Religion Zarathustras.
Gechichte-Gegenwart-Rituale. Band 1. Kohlhammer Verlag: Köln: 2002: 168-174.
26
The phrase was used first by President George W. Bush in his State of the Union address on 29
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At the same time, the Zoroastrian church established its own institutional system, an
ecclesiastic organization which had not existed previously. Two powerful persons of
the 3rd century, Tansar and Kardir, organised the Zoroastrian clergy into a hierarchical
church which was modelled on the state administration: the church was headed by the
mobedan mobed, the equivalent of the king of kings, followed on the provincial level
by the provincial mobeds, the structure ending with local mobeds in the bottom of the
system.27
Establishing organizational structures went hand in hand with the standardization of the
religious doctrine: Zoroastrian priests narrowed down the competing readings of
Zoroastrian religion, and defined the circle of canonical texts, which was followed by
the codification of the Avesta (although complete standardisation was never achieved).
Religious practices which were irreconcilable with the new doctrine were eliminated
(e.g. the cult of Anahita); this is how a central role was given to the fire cult, an already
existent but not exclusive form of cultic activity.28
All of these had the logical consequence that Zoroastrianism, now redefined, was
elevated to the rank of state religion and, therefore, the Zoroastrian church presented
itself as a powerful political player for centuries. Its influence was further developed
when almost the entire legal functions were transferred into the hands of the Zoroastrian
priesthood: the various dignitaries of the Zoroastrian church were at the same time
judges deciding in civil and criminal cases, interpreting legal norms and the head of the
church, and the chief mobed was the legal advisor to the king ex officio. It comes as
no surprise that the religious law established by the Zoroastrian priesthood was at the
same time the law of the Empire and the fact that not a single royal decree has reached
us can hardly be explained only by archaeological misfortune.29
In this world view, there was hardly any place for followers of other religions, and in
fact, the persecution of the members of other religions began in the first decades of
Sasanian rule, putting an end to the previous tolerant policy.

27
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London, Boston: 1979: 106-109.
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The first targets of religious persecutions were the Manicheans, the Jews of Babylonia
suffered less, while the situation of the Iranian Christians depended heavily, but not
exclusively, on the actual state of affairs of foreign policy, Christian Roman and
Byzantine Empires being the rivals of Sasanian Iran.30
The persecution of Christians was achieved by legal means, but these criminal
procedures were in the majority of the cases examples of show trials where almost no
attempt was made to observe even contemporary Zoroastrian criminal law.31
The reign of mobeds was a collective rule, and the powerful mobedan mobed was not a
leader in one person, but the head and representative of the priestly class. There was
strong group cohesion within the Zoroastrian church, a caste-like, closed system since
it could be entered only by birth. The group cohesion protected members who were in
line with the policy of the clergy but eliminated dissenting members as happened with
Mazdak, most probably a Zoroastrian priest whose egalitarian teaching attracted the
underprivileged. The movement was supported by the monarch Kavad at first (495–
531 AD); later, however, when the initially peaceful movement stirred up acts of
violence and brought general chaos upon the country, he changed his policy. The
movement was suppressed by Kavad’s chosen heir to the throne, Khosrav I, in the years
before his ascent to the throne of Iran.32
Political behaviour was determined by religious doctrines and by the interests of the
church while consideration of state interests was either of secondary importance or nonexistent. Some examples prove that rulers opposing the power of mobeds and the
nobility were dethroned, blinded, imprisoned, sometimes even killed by the joint effort
of both the clergy and the nobility (e.g. Kavad (488-496; 498-531), Hormizd IV (579590), Khosrav II (590-628), Ardasir III (630)).

A short introduction to the history of the Jews in Iran and Babylonia is Jacob Neusner’s: Jews in Iran.
In: The Cambridge History of Iran vol. 3(2): Cambridge University Press: Cambridge: 1983: 909–923.
A detailed analysis of the same topic is to be found in his multi volume magnum opus: A History of the
Jews in Babylonia. E. J. Brill Leiden: 1965-1969; concerning Iranian Christians Jes Peter Asmussen’s
paper: Christians in Iran. In: The Cambridge History of Iran vol. 3(2), Cambridge University Press:
Cambridge: 1983: 924– 948 is a good point of departure but recent scholarship has already challenged
some of his views: Richard Payne: A State of Mixture: Christians, Zoroastrians, and Iranian Political
Culture in Late Antiquity. University of California Press: Los Angeles: 2016.
31
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Antiqua XLII (2007): 373-384. Peeters Publisher: Ghent; source material is the acts of martyrs, which
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32
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Buchgesellschaft: Darmstadt: 990: 47-52; Touraj Daryaee: Sasanian Empire:The Rise and Fall of an
Empire. I. B. Tauris: New York: 2009: 26-30.
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The queens Buran and Azarmidukht as well as others were in power only for a very
short period of time between 630 and 632, leaving the king as the only figure to
represent the interests of the Iranian state against lobbying interests, with less and less
success as time went on.
This policy did not change even when the decline of the demoralised dynasty and the
attacks of the first Muslim groups brought the state to the brink of collapse.33
The fall of the Iranian state brought about the demise of the Zoroastrian church as well;
therefore, this policy was ineffective and self-destructive for both the nobility and the
priesthood.34
Efforts to strengthen the power of the clergy were also visible in works on political
theory, written by priestly scholars.
One of them, the Letter of Tansar, claims that the heir to the throne was to be elected
from among the sons of the dead ruler by the leading officials of the imperial
administration and the mobedan mobed, but in case of disagreement, it was the mobedan
mobed whose vote decided. Sources prove that this was far from contemporary
political reality and no king left the decision on his heir to any of his officials.
Nevertheless, the demand itself speaks volumes about the ambitions of the clergy.35
Despite both theoretical and practical efforts to decimate the king into a shadow figure,
the Sasanian monarch remained the most important political figure for centuries.
Therefore, we can witness a dual rule of kings and mobeds, best expressed in the socalled twin-theory formulated in the Letter of Tansar. Accordingly, religion and
kingship are twins born of one womb and never to be separated.36 This is not a fully
developed hierocracy like the Caliphate which unites both religious and secular
administration but is closer to the Byzantine model with the emperor and the patriarch
on his side.

33
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2.2. Islam
After the fall of the Sasanians, there was no independent Iranian state for centuries,
Iranian territories being incorporated into the Islamic Caliphate. Although the
conquering Saljuqids made some efforts to organise an Iranian state with effective
administration, they ultimately failed as did the Mongols and the Timurids.
Only the rule of the Safavids (1501–1736) is worth mentioning in a discussion of Iranian
hierocracy. The state of the Safavids, born in a power vacuum in Iran, was a turning
point because: (1) a central, sovereign Iranian state was established again; (2) political
power was seized by an originally Sufi order of Turkish origin, which embraced Shi’ism
in the long run and, therefore (3) proclaimed Shi’ism as the official religion of the state
in 1501.
Safavid rule represents a more developed form of hierocracy since the head of the
Safavid order was at the same time the Iranian monarch; thus the former dual structure
of the Sasanian state was replaced by a personal union. It is worth emphasizing that the
Iranian state was in fact governed by the head of a religious order, and it was not the
king who joined an order, a tiny but important difference. Even Shah Abbas the Great
(1587–1629) emphasised that he ruled as the leader of the Safavid order although it is
undeniable that whenever the interests of the order and the state were at variance, he
gave priority to the latter.37
What is more, the order sometimes even interfered with the system of succession to the
throne, as happened at the election of Safi I (1629–1642), at the coronation of whom
there was a marked emphasis on following the ceremonial rules of the Safavid order.
Only after Abbas II (1642–1666), that is, in the last decades of Safavid rule, became the
link to the order, an empty formality when the position of the head of the order sunk to
the level of a royal title, but monarchs were still regarded as having supernatural power
in the eyes of society at large.38
The regime formed after the Islamic revolution (1979) provides the third and most
developed model of Iranian hierocracy, which is different from its predecessors in
several aspects.
The most important structural difference is that we cannot find either dualism (between
the state and the church) or personal union (in the head of a religious order and the
state), since the leader of the revolution and the Islamic state (rahbar), that is,
Khomeini, was not head of any religious order.

37
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This is the most developed form of hierocracy because the leading person of the clergy
(marja’-e taqlid) is at the same time the supreme leader of the state, organs of state
administration being necessarily subordinated to him directly or indirectly.
Overcoming the dual system of the Sasanians the clergy was now victorious over the
state which had no leader of its own of equal standing to the rahbar. This is the reason
why the qualification of the rahbar was originally defined so that it had to be the leader
of the clergy alone who could fill the position.
The qualification of the rahbar was in fact tailored to Khomeini’s person, who indeed
fulfilled all the requirements. After his death, however, no eligible person was to be
found; therefore, the qualifications were modified, thus weakening the theoretical
foundations of the system. 39
With the advent of the Islamic republic, the revolution eliminated the monarchy because
of its alleged anti-Islamic nature, propagated by Khomeini himself, and shaped the
constitution in a way that the head of the clergy could have no rival.40 The president of
the republic is subordinate to the power of the rahbar, and since the Prime Minister was
no more efficient either, the position itself was abolished during a revision of the
constitution.
All of this led to the paralysis of executive power, witnessed time and again in
succeeding decades. Legislation by the Parliament (Majles) is also subordinate to the
power of the clergy as a result of the veto of the Guardian Council, controlled by Shi’a
religious scholars.41
Moreover, the leader of the clergy has been incorporated into the constitution, with his
unique qualities of leadership as the underlying principle of the constitution (velayat-e
faqih). This is more than concentration of power in the hands of one person, codified
in the constitution, since velayat-e faqih is a religious doctrine as well. Therefore, the
velayat-e faqih theory, legitimising the leadership of the rahbar, signifies a legal and a
theological foundation of the system at the same time.42
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Thus both executive and legislative powers are controlled and sometimes paralysed by
the dominant clergy.43
In other words, to uphold dominance and enforce the interests of the clergy takes
priority over the proper functioning of state organs: these are already signs of the selfdestructive policy of the mobeds and the nobility in the Sasanian period.
Similarly, to the rule of the mobeds, the current system also represents a collective rule:
a group-domination by the politically active members of the Shi’a clergy. This does
not include the whole clergy, as there are clerics who turn away from politics and
withdraw into the solitude of madrasas (in the same way as herbeds, the priest-teachers
who did not take part in political activities in the Sasanian era), and there are also
dissenting clerics.
The latter are sometimes more threatened by the oppressive mechanism of the regime
than civilians are, since a separate court has been established for processes against
dissenting clerics, and this court passes sentences of imprisonment and capital
punishment by the hundreds: up to 1990, 286 clerics were convicted, including 14 death
penalties.44
This group, constantly changing in composition, rent with inner conflict and fraught
with faction-battles, is not a ‘party’ or any other institution but a conglomerate of
learned individuals sharing common values, beliefs and interests protected by both the
constitution and its supreme leader. In this respect, it resembles the Sasanian
hierocracy, which also had its own supreme leader but lacked, obviously, any
constitutional support.
Therefore, the person of the leader was of vital importance for both the Sasanian and
the current clergy since it was the leader who protected their common interests against
anybody (including the representative of the Iranian state), guaranteed inner cohesion,
and punished dissenting members. But the position of the two leaders is different in
their respective systems: the leading role of the mobedan mobed was a consequence of
his position in the ecclesiastic hierarchy while that of the marja’-e taqlid is the result of
his position in the scientific hierarchy among the learned and, therefore, learning and
social prestige are the dominant factor in his selecting.
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To achieve the smooth operation of the Sasanian clergy was easier, since a new
administrative leader could be created any time to avoid a leadership vacuum, whereas
it is not easy to find a genuine spiritual leader, which may lead to leadership crises, as
happened after Khomeini’s death in 1989.45
3. Common features
3.1 Foreign policy
In what follows I will explain the common features of the three hierocratic systems
outlined above. For the sake of clarity, I divided them into foreign and domestic issues,
although, evidently, there are interactions between these two fields.
In the field of foreign affairs, the first striking phenomenon is the confrontational,
offensive policy, most of all during the first decades of a given period, predominantly
directed against the West.
The Roman wars of the Sasanians, even though they had antecedents in the Parthian
period, were offensive encounters of this kind, which began to lose their intensity after
the initial successes of Shapur I (241–270 CE), and ended in defeats and territorial
losses at the end of the 3rd century, and resulting in upholding the status quo in the
following century.46
We can find a similar situation in the early Safavid period when the wars against the
Ottomans stopped with the defeat at Chaldiran (1514), establishing the status quo which
changed only to the disadvantage of the Iranians with the loss of Mesopotamia.47
The foreign policy of the current regime directed against the West also began with a
complete change of orientation (the shah being a close ally to the US), hallmarked by
the occupation of the American embassy, and it has been going on until the present day
on the level of both rhetoric and armaments.
None of these three regimes was able to transform initial, rather symbolic victories into
political or territorial advantage in the long run.
•

The Sasanians, it is true, conquered some Roman towns near the border but it
was the most they could achieve and finally had to withdraw.
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The Safavids, too, gained some minor victories over the Ottomans due to their
surprise attacks and enthusiasm at the beginning but were routed in the battle of
Chaldiran.
The current regime also enriched itself with a symbolic victory over the US with
an attack against the American embassy but nothing more was achieved: the
hostage crises ended, and Iran found herself on the defensive against Iraq.

The intensity of these early confrontations is in direct relationship to the ideologicalrhetorical attacks that accompany them. The anti-West onslaughts of Khomeini (the
US as the great Satan) and Ahmadinejad are essentially no different from the inscription
of Shapur I in which the Roman emperor is depicted as a dishonest liar (again!)
attacking his country.48
It is an important question why Iran is so aggressive on the western front and far less
belligerent on the others. I think the reason for this is the fact that Iran always had to
face stronger attacks from the west, both in a military and in an ideological sense, while
she was less vulnerable from other directions.
As mentioned above, during its history Iran had to face strong military competition from
the west which she was unable to overcome (Roman-Byzantine advances, the military
supremacy of the Ottomans, the military predominance of the West).
As far as ideology is concerned, Iran had to face strong ideological and religious
competitions coming from the west against which she had to protect herself. During
the Sasanian period, ideological unity (Zoroastrianism) had to be established against
Hellenistic, post-Hellenistic, and Christian Rome. Similarly, Shi’ism became the
official religion because it markedly separated Iran from the Sunnite-Hanafite
Ottomans. In modern times, the program of re-Islamization against secular
westernisation is in line with the previous policies.
No such attacks were perceived from the east from whence no concurrent ideologies
threatened with victory. Therefore, foreign policy toward the east was no more than
defence against the nomads (Massagetes, Huns, Turks, Mongols, Uzbeks) for two
thousand years. Hinduism did not enter Iran, Buddhism reached only Merv on the
eastern border, and conquering Turkish-Mongol people adopted Iranian culture
(embraced Islam) instead of forcing their own belief on the Iranian population.
Soviet Communism as an ideology was not perceived to be as dangerous as Western
ideas already present in Iran during the Pahlavi regime. No surprise, then, that the
Soviet Union was the lesser evil for Khomeini: Iran shared a common border with the
Soviets but none with the Americans.
48
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This offensive but at the same time self-defensive foreign policy was accompanied by
a cultural policy which emphasized Iranian heritage in general and the Iranian religious
tradition and included the denial and occasionally the demonization of the outside
world. The cultural policy of the Sasanians was strongly built around the first organized
Iranian religious tradition, Zoroastrianism, both in domestic and foreign policy.
Legitimacy, social structure, legal system and cultural life were all in line with
Zoroastrian religious demands as were foreign and religious policy. The latter included
a harsh denial of Christianity (the leading ideology of the West) in the form of both
apologetic writings and prosecution of Iranian Christians.49
Shi’ism, when declared to be the official religion of the Safavids, had a similar function:
it displayed a marked separation from the Ottomans, the rival from the West and from
the less dangerous Southern power, India. Thus, it is religious ideology again which
separates Iran from the other powers. But it had the consequence that Iran became more
and more isolated from both the Muslim societies and the Western world.
It is symptomatic that among Safavid rulers it was only Shah Abbas the Great who was
acquainted with the contemporary trends of international politics and who took some
steps to strengthen his rule with diplomatic efforts among the nations.50 In the modern
period, the anti-Western rhetoric of writer Al-e Ahmad (gharbzadegi:’weststruckness’)51 became one of the most important messages of the Islamic revolution,
reduced to a few brief slogans understandable for all, emphasising the need to forget
about foreign ideas and to return to the genuine Iranian cultural heritage.
The current regime had chosen for the third time in Iranian history to isolate its country
from the world with the help of religious ideas and it is the opposition, quite logically,
which is more receptive to foreign, mainly Western, ideas (democracy, human rights,
etc.).
These rejectionist policies resulted in losing touch with contemporary global trends and
Iran found herself sooner or later in a fight against powers of unequal strength.
Byzantium was stronger than Sasanian Iran in every respect (it was not by accident that
it survived the Sasanians by 800 years), just as the Ottoman state was more modern than
that of the Safavids in all decisive factors.
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The rejectionist policy of the current regime manifests itself in the wilful breach of the
norms and values of the international community (hostage crises, the denial of the
Holocaust) and the effort to build up a coalition with partners which share also an antiWestern political line for whatever reasons (e.g. Venezuela under Chavez). Despite
this there is no doubt about the regional power of Iran when governed by hierocracies:
the Sasanians were such a regional power and what is more, they were the only
dangerous rivals to Rome and Byzantium.
The regional power of the Safavids cannot be questioned either, although they were less
dangerous to the Ottomans than the Sasanians were to the Romans. The regional power
of Iran today cannot be doubted either; nevertheless, their more ambitious plans
certainly raise questions.
A similar continuity may be seen in the efforts to reach the Mediterranean Sea for both
geopolitical and economic advantages.
Already the Parthians fought desperate wars against Rome for the possession of Syria,
which the Sasanians continued in vain for centuries. The Safavids were prevented in
their similar intentions by the loss of Mesopotamia to the Ottomans, and in the modern
period states like Syria and Iraq stand in the way of these ambitions.
It is, of course, no accident that the current Iranian foreign policy is very active in Iraq,
Syria and Lebanon, participating in a complex matrix of regional conflicts in order to
achieve the upper hand and it is again the western powers (most importantly the United
States) which hinder Iran from doing so.
3.2 Domestic policy
Coming to domestic affairs, it is also important to point out that each hierocratic system
seized power by military means. Both the Sasanians and the current regime acquired
supremacy by armed revolts against the previous regimes (Parthians, Pahlavi
government). The Safavids, too, seized power with weapons, although they filled a
power vacuum in Iran rather than revolting against an established power.
A further similarity is that in all three cases the leaders of the new system were believed
to have supernatural powers, and they did not neglect to emphasise this. In his
inscription, Shapur I presented himself and his founding father, Ardashir, as the
descendant of gods, the interpretation of which causes considerable trouble to modern
scholarship but seemingly less to his contemporaries.52
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In a similar vein, Shah Isma’il I saw and represented himself as a kind of a supernatural
being, a claim unconditionally accepted by his followers.53 This is exactly why the
defeat at Chaldiran was a turning point in Safavid history, since it was more than a
military collapse in a battle against the Ottomans: it was the charisma of Isma’il that
was destroyed.
Despite this, later kings also demanded a certain superhuman status, the acceptance of
which was made possible by a religious system built upon a peculiar combination of
Sufism, folk Islam and Shi’ism. The situation was essentially similar in the case of
Khomeini as well. Although he never made claims to a supernatural position, his
followers attributed a charisma to him which made his leadership unquestionable. His
supernatural position was replaced by his standing as marja’-e taqlid, rahbar and the
constitutional superpowers granted him by the Iranian constitution. Moreover, he was
referred to as Imam, a title reserved for the Twelve Imams, a novelty which some clerics
believed was on the edge of blasphemy.54
Outstanding personalities were decisive in the chain of events or, to put it differently:
the establishment of the hierocracies was rather the personal achievement of the leading
figures than the result of a popular uprising or the attempt of the powerful clergy to
achieve dominance.
Sasanian history began with the revolt of Ardashir against his overlord, the Parthian
king, which was no more than a successful attempt to seize power by an overly
ambitious petty local leader which was not backed by the mobeds at that time. What is
more, the establishment of the Zoroastrian church and its incorporation into the state
administration took place only subsequently, in a long and systematic process which
reached its peak only towards the end of the 3rd century. Neither can we find the Shi’a
clergy behind Isma’il I, a lonely hero with a small group of enthusiastic followers
fighting for power.
Since Iran was overwhelmingly Sunni at this time, obviously no Shia clergy existed to
back Isma’il’s movement. To overcome this shortcoming, Safavids had Shi’a legal
scholars, the Amilis, brought in from Syria to work on the ideological foundations and
the power structure of the new system which lasted for several generations.55
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The current system is not different in this respect, since the Islamic revolution was
fought not by the Shi’a clergy as a group but mostly by Khomeini himself, who was
supported by a variety of different social groups, while the clergy was divided on the
issue of whether or not they should give up their traditional apolitical attitude and take
part in everyday political activities. The victory of the revolution reinforced the position
only of the politically active clerics again as a result of a longer process.
Behind these regime changes there were no socio-economic considerations, attempt at
economic reform or even rhetorical references to such aims. Under the early Sasanians,
socio-economic conditions deteriorated compared to the less rigid and repressive
Parthian rule, which had not established a caste-like social structure as its successor did.
Isma’il I, too, was not in the least concerned with the wellbeing of his subjects, had no
intention to be so, and his followers did not support him because of any such demand.
Abbas the Great was the single ruler among the Safavids who tried to revive agriculture,
industry and commerce, but his successors created such chaos in these fields that the
state lacked enough economic-military power to oppose the Afghan invaders.56
The Islamic revolution was not born out of the intention to eliminate poverty either,
although it is true that the revolution was backed predominantly by the impoverished,
mostly urban, population who were no beneficiaries of Pahlavi modernization.
Should they have any hopes for economic progress, these were soon dashed since, as of
today, the presidency of Rafsanjani was the only brief period during which economic
considerations received any attention.57
As Khomeini put it: “Economics is for donkeys” and “We did not make a revolution to
slash the price of watermelon.”58
Though President Ahmadinejad emphasised again the issues of economics during his
presidency, this policy did not change the fundamental orientation of the regime. Basic
issues remained what they were for decades: the role of the rahbar and that of the clergy
in politics, the interpretation of Islam, the role of the state in society and the struggle
for more international influence.
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Opposition thinkers such as Soroush, Shabestari, Kadivar and others do not criticize the
regime on grounds of what they perceive as bad economic policy but present a different
religious understanding of Shi’ism, another interpretation of Islamic law and have
dissenting views on the role of the clergy in politics and democracy.59
3.3 Ideology
Another remarkable common feature of these three systems is a strong ideological unity
guarded by unbending rigor. To explain this one may often come across the argument
that without such an ideological unity it would be impossible to keep together a state
like Iran with her enormous size and geographical division. No doubt, there is
considerable merit in this argument, but it should be qualified since the empires of the
Achaemenids and the Parthians were significantly larger than the states run by the
hierocracies and they still managed to survive for altogether 700 years.
To understand this, we should bear in mind that the Achaemenid and the Parthian states
were decentralized, being a conglomerate of local autonomies attached to and
controlled by the court, a system which could function without any compulsory
ideology. By contrast, hierocracies always attempted to create a centralized
government (with varying success) which was backed in fact by a similarly centralized
ideology in order to eliminate local autonomies and secessionist movements. If the
central governments were able to protect the unity of the country with political and
military means, Iran remained intact. When, however, the government failed to do so,
the country fell apart into different smaller territorial units. This happened after the fall
of the Sasanians and the disintegration of the Safavid state resulted in the same end.
Closely connected to this ideological centralization we can find the policy of declaring
the primacy of religious law. In the Sasanian period, Zoroastrian law functioned as
state law as well, and in the modern period we can also witness Shi’a law being the
foundation of Iran’s legal system. More importantly, the entire legal function was
concentrated in the hands of the clergy: in the Sasanian period, jurisdiction was
administered by the clergy, with different priests (rad, mobed ) in charge of particular
courts, and the whole system was controlled by the mobedan mobed with his theoretical
and practical directives.
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In principle, the head of the legal system was the monarch as the supreme judge, but in
the absence of a well-organised system of appeals, it did not work. People had the
chance to appeal to the king only twice a year during two religious festivals, but this
clearly inoperative system was eliminated in the 5th century, and the king lost his last
opportunity to alter the corrupt or unlawful decisions of his officials to the advantage
of the society.60
A similar tendency can be observed in the Safavid period as well: under Shah Sulayman,
in 1683, the right to appeal to the monarch was abolished, with the result that society
lost its last legal hope to correct an unlawful or wrong judgment.61
The present-day court system is also under the influence of the ‘ulama’, especially the
special court of the clergy, which is under the exclusive control of the rahbar, with the
task of charging dissenting clerics.62 The rahbar therefore fulfils the same function in
the modern legal life as the mobedan mobed did previously, since his statements are
regarded as theoretical and practical guidance for courts.
These systems are also characterised by a tendency to diminish the inherent pluralism
of the official religion by attempting to elevate one single interpretation to canonical
status while neglecting others, although the regimes never fully succeeded in this effort.
For example, Sasanian Zoroastrianism highlighted the fire-cult and abolished the cult
of goddess Anahita even though the ruling dynasty had strong ties to this cult, but was
unable to diminish Zurvanism, a Zoroastrian ‘heresy’ even followed by some Sasanian
kings.63
The current system also emphasises a legalist-normativist understanding of Shi’ism and
tries to downplay other interpretations, although they are deeply rooted in Islamic
tradition and were taught in madrasas for a long time. Contemporary thinkers such as
Montazeri, Soroush, Kadivar, Shabestari, and former Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan,
clerics and intellectuals who backed the Islamic revolution and the Islamic regime for
years or even decades, developed rival interpretations of Islam to the current, legalistnormativist reading in previous years.64 But these ideas were regarded as onslaughts
on the official religious understanding and these persons were treated immediately as
enemies although they previously belonged to the inner circle of power.
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If pluralism within the official religion was not tolerated, the status of other religions
deteriorated even more. Some religions were allowed to exist (Judaism, Christianity)
while some others were not.
It is interesting to note here that religions having nothing (or little) to do with the official
religion were treated much less harshly than those which came into being as a result of
a schism within the official religion. Mazdakism was brutally uprooted in the late
Sasanian period. Followers of Manicheism, a very complex religion built upon Iranian
tradition were persecuted during the entire Sasanian period.
Meanwhile, a few atrocities against the Jews and Christians were in the spotlight of
Sasanian wrath when the rulers believed that foreign policy demanded punitive actions
against them (since they could easily be charged with loyalty to the enemy, that is Rome
and Byzantium). In the Safavid period we can occasionally observe the persecution of
Sunnites (Abisaab, 2004, 24-27; 33-35), but the Baha’is, followers of a new religion
deeply rooted in Islamic tradition, were denied any protection and are not members of
tolerated religions according to the current constitution.
It is not to say, of course, that followers of tolerated religions were treated equally with
members of the official religion but at least they could operate, although atrocities
occurred as in the case of Tateos Mikaelian, an Armenian priest murdered in 1994.65
Advocates of foreign ideologies are treated similarly to adherents of non-official
religions irrespective of whether they are for Western (democracy, human rights,
political pluralism, etc.) or non-Western (e.g. Soviet-type socialism) thought. The
Iranian communist party, the Tudeh, was outlawed at the very beginning of the Islamic
republic irrespective of the fact that it was also a member of the broad coalition against
the shah’s regime.
Similarly, advocates of Western thought are believed to be or at least denounced as
Western agents collaborating with foreign powers against Iran, a charge with serious
consequences. This helps us understand why leaders of the green opposition demanding
more democracy and openness hastened to declare publicly that they respect the
underlying principle of the Iranian constitutional system, velayat-e faqih, although this
undermines their own program, since this very principle is the most important obstacle
in the way of further democratisation.
Another common feature of these systems is that they represent a collective rule. The
present-day regime is not a one-party system or a personal dictatorship, and to interpret
the power of the rahbar as a one-person leader or a dictator would be to misunderstand
the situation.
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The rahbar is only the leading representative of the clergy, its political and ideological
leader and the guardian of the hierocracy. The mobedan mobed used to have the same
position: as the head of the Zoroastrian church he represented its interest at the royal
court, influenced political decisions and guaranteed the ideological unity. But powerful
Zoroastrian clergy was a relatively narrow circle: just as not every priest was involved
in politics in the Sasanian era, not every cleric participates in political activities today.
The functions of local, low rank priests and clerics are reduced to local leadership and
propaganda: as earlier it used to be the provincial mobeds who fulfilled these roles,
today it is the imams of the Friday prayer sent to the countryside who do the same.
Besides political advantages, all three systems provided economic advantages, too, for
their members. The mobeds were in a privileged position in the Sasanian era in an
economic sense as well, and they did not hesitate to support the monarch if the
protection of the existing feudal order was at stake. The Safavid period was not at all
different; the privileged status of Shi’a legal scholars, judges and high-ranking officials,
and the financial advantages provided for them by the vaqfs (pious “endowments”),
were in sharp contrast to the miserable plight of peasants who were close to starvation
in a year of poor harvest.
It is no accident that when chronicles wanted to emphasize the scope of sufferings, they
claimed that not even members of the ‘ulama’ had enough to eat. In this context the
proverbs, satires parodying the hypocritical behaviour of the ‘ulama’ are
understandable together with the increasing enthusiasm for Sufism, which can be
interpreted as a non-political, religious opposition to the dominant Shi’a normativism.
No wonder that this development gained strength in the last decades of Safavid rule,
that is, during the time of disintegration and economic collapse.66
Today, too, the hypocritical behaviour of the mullahs comes up against constant
criticism, the social and economic positions and the autocratic way of exercising power
meet increasing social opposition. The socio-economic dissatisfactions logically
manifested themselves in a religious disguise in these hierocratic systems. The
Mazdakite movement in the Sasanian period started as a religious reform supported by
the destitute, the impoverished peasants who had lost their lands. Nowadays, leading
thinkers of the opposition started a religious discourse to point out the shortcomings of
the current regime and to elaborate their own religious and political vision. The
programs of Soroush, Kadivar and Shabestari urge a religious reform, highlighting the
reconsideration of the principle velayat-e faqih. No wonder that the regime answers in
a similarly religious way: labelling every member of the opposition collectively as
hypocrites.67
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Conclusions
As outlined above, the three hierocratic systems share a variety of common features in
their composition, domestic and foreign policy, socio-economic structure and power
base. It is not to say, of course, that they are identical in every respect. Perhaps the
most remarkable difference is that the hierocracy of the Sasanian period manifested
itself in a dual system, with parallel and competing competencies between the
Zoroastrian church and the state.
The Safavid system was already monistic in the sense that the leader of the Safavid
order was at the same time the head of the state, this personal union guaranteeing a coordinated relationship between the two, with the interests of the latter in mind whenever
the two clashed.
The current system differs from its forerunners in that it emphasises the priority of the
hierocracy: the leader of the clergy is at the same time the supreme leader of the Iranian
state and every state organ (including the president, the government and the legislative)
is ultimately under his direct or indirect control. Being, however, a collective rule, it is
small wonder that important positions in the economy, the media and the judiciary are
in the hands of the clergy and its non-cleric allies.
When the interest of clerical rule is at variance with the proper function of state organs,
it is in most of the cases that the former one gains the upper hand and dominates.
This is the reason of the numerous dysfunctions in the government and the legislature,
known by both Iranian politicians and society.
But I think it is not what Khomeini originally had in mind. Studying his fatvas and
decisions we can find numerous examples to prove that the leader of the revolution gave
priority to the interests of the state. In his opinion the only thing that matters is the
interest of the Islamic state, and this is the only one which must be taken into
consideration. Shocking some in his audience he once declared that the government of
the Islamic state has the right to override even Islamic legal regulations such as the
pilgrimage, if that is what the interests of the community, that is, the Iranian state,
require (Schirazi 1998, 64).68
In other words, Khomeini resembles rather a Safavid ruler, while his current successors
are uncertain as to what strategy to follow. This loss of orientation is the most important
cause of the fragmentation within the ruling elite which can be perceived even by
outsiders.
I outline the results of the comparison in the table that follows:
68
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Issues of
systemic
comparison
Head of the state

97

Sasanian period

Safavid period

Islamic republic

Monarch

Head of the
Safavid order

Leader of the clergy:
marja’-e taqlid and
rahbar
Leading jurist of the
clergy and rahbar

Position of the Head of a church,
leader of the vertically structured
clergy
Religious
King is supernatural
standing of the (god): Ardashir I;
first leaders
Shapur I

Head of an order
and ruler

Origin
Clerical backing No priests behind the
of the movement revolt

Wars with rivals
No Shi’a clerics
behind the
movement

Political ideology

Shi’ism

Twin-theory: state and
church are twins
Status of state Trying to abolish
religion
immanent pluralism
and to establish one
canonical
interpretation
Clerical positions Court, judiciary,
teaching, propaganda,
intellectual elite
Privileges for the
hierocracy

Political and economic
privileges

Economic policy
Religious policy

No priority
State religion; others
tolerated or persecuted

Cultural policy

Inward looking;
internationally isolated

Foreign policy

Offensive in the early
decades
West; only defensive
in other directions

Orientation of
offensive foreign
policy
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Supernatural:
Isma’il I

Immanent
pluralism
narrowed

Court, judiciary,
teaching,
propaganda,
intellectual elite
Political and
economic
privileges
No priority
State religion;
others tolerated
or persecuted
Inward looking;
internationally
isolated
Offensive in the
early decades
West; only
defensive in other
directions

Imam, charisma and
above the
constitution:
Khomeini
Armed revolution
Clerics being
divided concerning
active role in
politics
Velayat-e faqih
Trying to abolish
immanent pluralism
and to establish one
canonical
interpretation
State organs,
judiciary, teaching,
propaganda,
intellectual elite
Political and
economic privileges
No priority
State religion; others
tolerated or
persecuted
Inward looking;
internationally
isolated
Offensive in the
early decades
West; only
defensive in other
directions
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Issues of
systemic
comparison
International
standing and
aim

Sasanian period

Safavid period

Islamic republic

Regional power;
confrontations with
rival local and global
enemies (Rome) to
achieve more

Regional power;
confrontations with
rival local and global
enemies (US, Iraq) to
achieve more

Head of the state

Monarch

Regional power;
confrontations
with rival local
and global
enemies
(Ottomans) to
achieve more
Head of the
Safavid order

Position of the
leader of the
clergy
Political system

Head of a church,
vertically structured

Head of an order
and ruler

Centralized;
opposition nonexistent or paralyzed

Political style

Oppressive; backed by
unquestionable
religious-political
ideology
Politically motivated
religious reform:
Mazdakism ending in
crushed popular
uprising

Centralized;
opposition nonexistent or
paralyzed
Oppressive;
religious-political
ideology is less
rigorous
Non-political
religious
disguise: Sufism

Forms of
opposition and
dissatisfaction

Leader of the clergy:
marja’-e taqlid and
rahbar
Leading jurist of the
clergy and rahbar
Centralized;
opposition nonexistent or paralyzed
Oppressive; backed by
unquestionable
religious-political
ideology
Politically motivated
religious discourse:
Sorush, Shabestari,
Kadivar

The end of such a long essay brings the question of what to learn from all this. In
answering this question, one should avoid two mistakes.
The first would be to think that we can infer from historical examples directly to future
events and can tell the future only because we have parallels in the past, however strong
these parallels may be. Historia est magister vitae is a commonplace, although with
merit, but is insufficient to build up theories or worse, policies, upon it.
The second mistake would be to forget all about these remarkable structural similarities.
As I have demonstrated, these came into being not by accident but as inherent features
of the Iranian hierocratic regimes. If we understand these, in fact very complex and
sometimes contradictory socio-economic and political factors, we can have a better
understanding of current Iran, which enables us to see things as they are.
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Now we see an Iran with a relatively stable system (the green movement is over, a
current Arab spring having no impact at all) although handicapped by a variety of
systemic contradictions and social dissatisfactions. The current hierocracy is, just like
its forerunners were, a centralized – both in state administration and ideology – and
strongly-controlled state which rules out any debate over fundamental issues. State
organs function despite numerous dysfunctional aspects, the territorial integrity of Iran
is in no danger while the opposition is divided and powerless.
This was the model of the previous hierocracies, too, which managed to survive for
many centuries and their collapse was brought about by their own unsolved inner
contradictions in the long run. External attacks (Arab-Muslim armies, invading
Afghans) only put an end to the agony, being consequences rather than causes.
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